Is Science The Only Way To Know Truth? (Can Science Validate Christianity?)

 

            Mankind should always be grateful to science for its incredible foray into the multivarious facets of life. However, a claim that surfaces during religious discussions assert that science is the only way to know the truth.

            Scientism posits science as the only source of human knowledge.  

            So, is science the only way to know the truth? Can science validate Christianity?

            The answer is a definite ‘No.’ Here’s why...

            First, the truth claim that science is the only way to know the truth is self-refuting because this very claim cannot be validated by science.

            Second, science has its limits. Science writer and public speaker, Dr. Alex Berezow posits the limitation of science, “Science has nothing to say about ethics. If we were to follow science exactly as prescribed, we do things like eugenics. Science has nothing really to say about how we should treat other people. I am a religious person. I am a Christian. Science is the best secular source of knowledge that we have. If I want to know how humans evolved, I don’t go to the Bible, I go to science. But if I want to know why we are here and what we are supposed to do, then I go to religious texts, then I go to my priests. I think there are two non-overlapping magisteria—science, which is secular, and religion, which talks about the bigger questions: the whys, the questions kids ask, which are the hardest ones to answer.”¹

            Christian apologist J. Warner Wallace of Cold Case Christianity lists the many things that we know without the benefit of science:²

            1. Logical and Mathematical truths

            2. Metaphysical truths

            3. Moral and Ethical truths

            4. Aesthetic truths

            5. Historical truths

            Last but not the least, if science cannot validate religion, are they both mutually exclusive? Or is there a definite relationship between science and religion?

            It may not be appropriate to endorse the idea that science and religion reign over separate conceptual kingdoms – separate “magisteria.” The magisteria of science covers ‘empirical facts,’ whereas the magisteria of religion extends over the search for the spiritual meaning of our lives. These, according to Stephen J. Gould, are nonoverlapping. This is the principle of Non Overlapping Magisteria (NOMA).

            William Lane Craig explains how science and religion can mutually and fruitfully interact. This is the summary of his thesis:³

1. Religion furnishes the conceptual framework in which science can flourish.

2. Science can both falsify and verify claims of religion.

3. Science encounters metaphysical problems which religion can help to solve.

4. Religion can help to adjudicate between scientific theories.

5. Religion can augment the explanatory power of science.

6. Science can establish a premiss in an argument for a conclusion having religious significance.

Endnotes:

¹https://bigthink.com/design-for-good/on-journalists-junk-science-and-why-science-cant-discover-all-truth

²https://coldcasechristianity.com/writings/the-dangers-of-scientism-and-an-over-reliance-on-science/

³https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/popular-writings/science-theology/what-is-the-relation-between-science-and-religion/

Websites last accessed on 23^rd August 2021. 

Why The Problem Of Evil Does Not Disprove Historic Christianity? (Understanding The Felix Culpa Theodicy) – Part 3

 

            Christian theologians and Christian philosophers have offered sufficient, reasonable, and philosophically sophisticated rebuttals to the problem of evil i.e. rebuttals to why God allows evil, pain, and suffering. Defense and theodicies constitute these rebuttals. One such theodicy is the Felix Culpa theodicy.

            Felix Culpa (O Happy Fault or Oh Blessed Sin) is a Latin expression used by the pre-medieval theologian Augustine when he said, “O happy fault that merited such and so great a Redeemer.” This he said in the context of man’s fall and the original sin.

            Two terms should be primarily defined in this context: Infralapsarianism and Supralapsarianism. These terms are associated with God’s decrees of the fall of man and the salvation plan of the Cross.

            To state more precisely, which of these decrees preceded the other? Did God decree the fall of man logically prior to the salvation plan?

            Supralapsarians claim that God decreed the salvation plan logically prior to the fall. Infralapsarians argue that the fall was logically prior to the salvation plan. (Felix Culpa theodicy is a derivative of Supralapsarianism.) This is an ongoing debate between the Supras and the Infras in the Christian community.

            Although Infralapsarians assert that the fall was logically prior to the salvation plan, this cannot be construed as God being ignorant of the fall or as a lapse in God’s knowledge.

            William Lane Craig’s explanation about infra and supra is a must-read, “The question is – does God decree the cross in order to rectify the fall, or does he decree the fall in order to bring about the cross? Which one is logically prior? Normally, I think most of us would think that the reason God decrees the cross is to solve this problem. God knows from the moment he creates human beings – he knows they will fall into sin – so he has predestined before the foundations of the world that he will send his Son to die to rectify that problem. That is Infralapsarianism. Supralapsarianism is different. It says God, in the council halls of eternity, says The greatest good that I could bring about would be sending my Son to die for humanity and redeeming this people for myself through Him. The cross is such a great good that this is my first desire. How am I going to bring about the cross? I need to have them fall. Otherwise I don’t have anything to redeem them from. Having decided to do the cross, he now decrees the fall in that light. You see the difference? It is just a different logical order. But both of the views affirm that God always foreknows what will happen. It is just a matter of which one has priority in his motivations.”¹

            The Incarnation & The Atonement Are The Greatest Goods: Alvin Plantinga, while postulating the theodicy of Felix Culpa, asserts that the Incarnation of the Lord Jesus Christ and HIS Atoning death (Atonement) on the Cross as the greatest goods, by far. He adds that the Incarnation and the Atonement as tremendous goods, better than any combination of other goods or any combination of evils (horrendous evils included).²

            Plantinga then postulates the Value Hypothesis about goodness, which states that every possible way that things could have been that includes Incarnation and Atonement is better than any possible way things could have been without Incarnation and Atonement.

            Fall Of Man Is A Necessary Condition: Now imagine this scenario. God’s desire is to create a magnificent world. But, given the value hypothesis, that level of value is achieved only when Incarnation and Atonement are present in the world. For incarnation and atonement to be present, the fall of man is a necessary condition (cf. Supralapsarianism).

            Plantinga writes[Emphasis Mine]:³

I believe that any world with incarnation and atonement is a better world than any without it--or at any rate better than any world in which God does nothing comparable to incarnation and atonement...So consider the splendid and gracious marvel of incarnation and atonement. I believe that the great goodness of this state of affairs, like that of the divine existence itself, makes its value incommensurable with the value of states of affairs involving creaturely good and bad. Thus the value of incarnation and atonement cannot be matched by any aggregate of creaturely goods. No matter how many excellent creatures there are in a world, no matter how rich and beautiful and sinless their lives, the aggregated value of their lives would not match that of incarnation and atonement; any world with incarnation and atonement would be better yet. And no matter how much evil, how much sin and suffering a world contains, the aggregated badness would be outweighed by the goodness of incarnation and atonement, outweighed in such a way that the world in question is very good. In this sense, therefore, any world with incarnation and atonement is of infinite value by virtue of containing two goods of infinite value: the existence of God and incarnation and atonement...

            When human beings sin, there would be evil and suffering. Moreover, only if human beings sin would there be a need for incarnation and atonement.

            God Created Our World With The Incarnation & The Atonement: So Plantinga concludes one very good reason for God to allow evil to exist is to create a world with incarnation and atonement, which are the greatest goods even better than any combination of evil. This then entails the necessity of sin whose natural and logical corollary is evil.   

            Supralapsarians Win: This theodicy also paves way for the Supralapsarians to win the battle against the Infralapsarians. The Felix Culpa theodicy necessitates God’s decree of the Incarnation and the Atonement to be logically prior to God’s decree of the fall of man. It is only by virtue of the incarnation and the atonement that the fall of man was necessitated. Plantinga writes:⁴

And as a bonus, we get a clear resolution of the supra/infra debate: the Supras are right. God's fundamental and first intention is to actualize an extremely good possible world, one whose value exceeds; but all those worlds contain Incarnation and Atonement and hence also sin and evil; so the decree to provide incarnation and atonement and hence salvation is prior to the decree to permit fall into sin. The priority in question isn't temporal, and isn't exactly logical either; it is a matter, rather, of ultimate aim as opposed to proximate aim. God's ultimate aim, here, is to create a world of a certain level of value. That aim requires that he aim to create a world in which there is Incarnation and Atonement--which, in turn, requires that there be sin and evil. So there is a clear sense in which the decree to provide salvation precedes the decree to permit sin; but there is no comparable sense in which the decree to permit sin precedes the decree to permit evil.

      Coming back to the Felix Culpa theodicy, Plantinga evaluates his theodicy against common objections such as: (1) Why God permits so much evil, and why God permits suffering? (2) Why is there so much sin and suffering? (3) God’s actualization of a world with incarnation and atonement requires suffering and evil on the part of HIS creatures, and a good deal of innocent suffering and evil (cosmic Munchausen-by-Proxy syndrome); is this fair and right?

     Answers to these objections are outside the scope of this article. However, if you are interested in learning more, then please read Plantinga’s answer to these objections in his article cited in the endnotes.⁵

Endnotes:

¹https://www.reasonablefaith.org/podcasts/defenders-podcast-series-1/s1-the-doctrine-of-man/the-doctrine-of-man-part-8/

²https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=le4C8QuUsMs&ab_channel=CenterforPhilosophyofReligion

³https://andrewmbailey.com/ap/FelixCulpa.pdf

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

Websites last accessed on 14^th August 2021. 

Why The Problem Of Evil Does Not Disprove Historic Christianity? (Understanding the Evidential Problem Of Evil) – Part 2

             My previous blog addressed the logical problem of evil. This blog will focus on the probabilistic or the evidential problem of evil.

            The logical problem of evil claims it is logically impossible for God and evil to coexist. Whereas the probabilistic or the evidential problem of evil argues it is highly unlikely or improbable that God exists, given the abundance of evil in our world.

            Professor Greg Ganssle expounds on the evidential problem of evil, “Even though it is possible that God has a reason to allow the evils we find in the world, it does not seem likely that there are good reasons for some of the evils we see. We cannot prove that there is no good reason, but if we have lots of cases in which it seems as though there is none, we will conclude that there probably is no good reason to allow these evils. If it is true that probably there is no good reason to allow these cases of evil, then it is probable that God does not exist. This argument is called the “evidential argument” because we cannot prove that there is no good reason to allow the particular evils we are thinking about. These evils do, then, look like good evidence that God does not exist.”¹

            He further emphasizes that the premise “there probably is no good reason to allow these evils” is dubious and can be debunked.

            Is it even reasonable for man, who is so limited in his epistemic ability (his finiteness) and who is prone to error (fallible), to grasp the metaphysical nature of God and HIS reasons to allow evil?

            So the atheologian’s assertion that we should know the reason for the existence of evil is not reasonable. Greg Ganssle offers two reasons:

            (1) Since God has given free will to man, he is prone to evil.

            (2) A finite and a fallible man cannot expect to know every reason that God may have to allow evil.

            Ganssle states, “There are two reasons we can’t always make this claim. First, we can figure out reasons that God might have for many (perhaps most) of the evils in the world. For example, both human freedom and a stable, cause-effect universe are necessary for any meaningful action. Meaningful action, then, may be a reason that God allows various kinds of evil. Second, it is reasonable to think that God will have reasons that we cannot grasp for allowing evils in our lives. In fact, to think that we should be able to figure out God’s reasons for allowing every case of evil implies that we think God is not much smarter than we are. If God is the almighty creator of the universe, there will be evil the reason for which we cannot discern. This is exactly what we should expect if there is a God. It cannot be counted as evidence against God.”²

            William Lane Craig, in his response to the evidential problem of evil, posits doctrines in the Christian faith that increases the probability of the coexistence between God and evil. These are the four doctrines:³

            A. The chief purpose of life is not happiness, but the knowledge of God.

            B. Mankind is in a state of rebellion against God and His purpose.

            C. The knowledge of God spills over into eternal life (cf. 2 Cor. 4:16-18).

            4. The knowledge of God is an incommensurable good.

            Therefore, human freedom, the finiteness and the fallibility of man, and the four doctrines of the Christian faith offers a reasonable first line of defense against the evidential problem of evil.

Endnotes:

¹http://northsidebaptistlakeland.com/home/180006826/180006826/Images/Problem%20of%20evil.pdf

²Ibid.

³https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/popular-writings/existence-nature-of-god/the-problem-of-evil/

Websites last accessed on 10^th August 2021. 

Why The Problem Of Evil Does Not Disprove Historic Christianity? (Understanding the Logical Problem Of Evil) – Part 1

 

            The Problem of Evil is a legitimate obstacle to belief in any theistic religion because it posits the nonexistence of God. So, theistic beliefs should present either a Theodicy (explanation as to why God is justified in allowing evil) or a Defense (stating the probable existence of God-justifying reasons) against the problem of evil.

            Historic Christianity presents, arguably, the most plausible theodicies and defenses against the problem of evil. Dr. William Lane Craig asserts that “Christian theism is man’s last best hope of solving the problem of evil.”¹

            Significantly, the problem of evil proves God’s existence. As Ravi Zacharias said, If there is ‘evil,’ then one should assume there’s ‘good.’ When ‘good’ and ‘evil’ are assumed then we should also assume there is a ‘moral law’ based on which we differentiate between ‘good’ and ‘evil.’ If we assume a ‘moral law,’ then there must be a ‘moral law giver.’ But that’s who the atheologians are trying to disprove!

            So if there is no objective ‘moral law giver,’ then there is no objective ‘moral law.’ If there’s no ‘moral law,’ there is no ‘good.’ If there is no ‘good,’ there is no ‘evil.’ Hence, the problem of evil self-destructs.

            Notwithstanding this argument, we should also consider the intellectual problem of evil. There are two versions:

            1. The Logical Problem of Evil or The Deductive Problem of Evil.

The atheologian argues that is not logical for the coexistence of evil and a loving, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent God. Apparently, God and evil are logically incompatible.

            2. The Probabilistic Problem of Evil or the Evidential Problem of Evil.

The atheologian concedes it is logically possible for God and evil to coexist. Nevertheless, he argues that it is highly improbable or unlikely for God’s existence given the abundance of evil and suffering.

Response to the Logical Problem of Evil:

            Before a Christian responds to the atheologian’s claim that it’s logically impossible for God and evil to coexist, it is the atheologian who ought to bear the burden of proof i.e. the atheologian has to prove that it is logically impossible for God and evil to coexist.

            Now, to the Christian response: All that needs to be established here is a possibility of morally sufficient reason(s) for God to permit evil. If there are morally sufficient reasons (or even if there is one morally sufficient reason) for the coexistence of God and evil, then it is logically possible for God and evil to coexist.

            There is a hidden assumption in the argument of the atheologian. He assumes that God, who is all-loving and all-powerful, should be able to create a world without evil and suffering. But is this argument necessarily true? This is the question a Christian must ask.

            Is the atheologian asking God to do the logically impossible? Is the atheologian’s claim that God should be able to create a world without suffering similar to asking if God can create a rock so heavy that HE cannot lift it?  

            Alvin Plantinga, a highly distinguished Christian philosopher, offers a ‘Free Will Defense.’ He claims that if God creates man with free will, then it is incumbent upon God to allow man to make free choices. As William Lane Craig explains, “So if God grants to people genuine freedom to choose as they like, it is impossible for God to guarantee what their choices will be. He can simply create the circumstances in which he places the person with free will and then, so to speak, stand back and let the person make that free choice... Thus, it is possible that there is no world of free creatures which is feasible to God which is a sinless world. It is possible that in every world of free creatures that God could create that someone in that world would go wrong and would freely sin and introduce evil into that world”²

            Hence, it is clear that the atheologian is asking God to do the logically impossible. But God will not do the logically impossible, so God cannot/will not create a world with free creatures and at the same time prevent them from exercising their freedom to do evil.  

            William Lane Craig further explains Alvin Plantinga’s free will defense with respect to natural evils (earthquakes, tsunami, landslides, etc.) He posits evil spirits or demons as the cause of natural evils, “Demons have free will just as human beings do, and it might be the case that God could not preclude these natural disasters without taking away the free will of these demonic beings. You might think that such a solution to the problem of natural evil is ridiculous and maybe even frivolous, but then you would be confusing the logical version of the problem of evil with the probabilistic version of the problem of evil. Someone who is offering merely a defense does not have to offer a plausible solution. All he has to do is show a possible solution – a possible explanation – and if he can show that it is even possible that God and evil coexist then it follows that the atheist’s argument has been unsuccessful. The atheist has not been able to show that God and evil are logically incompatible with each other.”³

            So by way of conclusion, the atheologian’s claim that it is logically impossible for God and evil to coexist is not valid. Since God has blessed man with free will, God will not prevent man to make choices that may even go against HIS Holy will, which is to do evil. Therefore, because of free will, it is logically possible for God and evil to coexist.

(To be continued...)

Endnotes:

¹https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/popular-writings/existence-nature-of-god/the-problem-of-evil/

²https://www.reasonablefaith.org/podcasts/defenders-podcast-series-1/s1-the-problem-of-evil/the-problem-of-evil-part-1/#_ftn4

³Ibid.

Websites last accessed on 7^th August 2021.